The Evaluated Configuration – Defining a user-friendly Target of Evaluation

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Overview

- Definitions
 - Target of Evaluation (TOE)
 - Evaluated Configuration
- Examples
 - Configuration Restrictions
 - Assumptions
- Enhancing the Business Value
- Example: SUSE Linux on IBM







Target of Evaluation (TOE)

- the TOE is often a product subset
 - "a product, a part of a product, a set of products, ..."
 CEM 2.2 B.6.2
- aspects of the TOE Boundary
 - product architecture
 - code ownership, legal implications
 - security relevance of product components
 - testing efforts







Evaluated Configuration

 a "specific configuration or set of configurations" of the TOE as defined in the Security Target CEM 2.2 B.6.2

 subject to: analysis, testing, vulnerability analysis, assumptions
 CEM 2.2 B.6.4







"a specific configuration"

limit the configuration flexibility offered by the product to

- prevent "insecure" configuration settings
 - e.g. by mandating SSL encryption
- improve mechanism strength
 - e.g. by enforcing a minimum password policy
- reduce testing effort
 - e.g. evaluation on a subset of supported platforms







Typical Assumptions

Examples for restrictions on the TOE environment:

- Security Function Protection
 - e.g. physical protection of software TOEs
- Security Function Support
 - e.g. CPU states to support privilege enforcement
- Threat mitigation
 - e.g. managed user community in the TOE's network
- "Root" assumption
 - TOE administrators are well-behaved and smart







Enhancing the Business Value

- evaluated configurations often
 - suit developer and evaluator
 - are not of much use in customer scenarios
- therefore: think out of the "evaluation" box
 - consider customer requirements
 - enable TOE interoperability
 - automate testing of multiple configurations
 - lift initial restrictions in TOE re-evaluations







Example: SUSE Linux on IBM

- initial assurance level EAL2
 - "proof of concept"

- re-evaluation at EAL3
 - augment TOE Security Functions (TSF)
 - enhance evaluated configuration







CAPP Compliance & TSF

- Controlled Access Protection Profile
 - requires EAL3 as minimum assurance level
 - compliance demonstrates the fulfillment of customer requirements!
- Additional TOE Security Functions
 - Auditing
 - SSL / TLS
 - Abstract Machine Testing







Strength of Function and Platforms

- Strength of Function / Attack Resistance
 - SOF increased from basic to medium
 - in line with EAL3, able to withstand higher attack potential
- Underlying Hardware
 - EAL2: IBM xSeries
 - EAL3: IBM xSeries, zSeries, iSeries, pSeries







Questions?

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